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Abstract. This work is primarily based on the use of software agents for 
automated negotiation. We present in this paper a test-bed for agents in an 
electronic marketplace, through which we simulated different scenarios 
allowing us to evaluate different agents’ negotiation behaviours. The system 
follows a multi-party and multi-issue negotiation approach. We tested the 
system by comparing the performance of agents that use multiple tactics with 
ones that include learning capabilities based on a specific kind of 
Reinforcement Learning technique. First experiments showed that the adaptive 
agents tend to win deals over their competitors as their experience increases. 
1   Introduction 
Internet and www popularity has strongly increased the importance and popularity of 
electronic commerce, which goes far beyond both the searching for services exposed 
in virtual stores and price comparison. Electronic commerce includes a negotiation 
process between buyers and sellers, in order to find an agreement over the price and 
other transaction terms. It also deals with service demands and electronic payment. 
Common systems that consider mainly the electronic ads, based on the creation of 
classified ads sites with search capabilities, can be enhanced by semi-intelligent 
mechanisms relying on agent technology. Such enhanced systems can be applied to 
the different stages of the Consumer Buying Behaviour model, as explained in [3][4]. 
In particular, when applying to the negotiation process, agents enable new types of 
transactions, where prices and other transaction issues need no longer to be fixed. 
A typical case of negotiation process is the auction. Negotiation on the Internet 
often amounts to one party (typically the seller) presenting a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposal (e.g., a sale price). Auctions represent a more general approach to look for 
an appropriate price, admitting a range of negotiation protocols [7]. These auction-
based negotiation protocols include the English auction, the Dutch auction, the First-
price Sealed Bid and the Vickrey auction. These auction-based protocols are called 
single-sided mechanisms, because bidders are all buyers or all sellers, and they also 
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include an auctioneer. Double-sided auctions admit multiple buyers and sellers at 
once, like the continuous double auction [7]. There are several auction-based systems 
that are in use for electronic commerce. 
AuctionBot is an auction server where software agents can be created to participate 
in several types of auctions. Kasbah is a web-based system where users create 
autonomous agents that buy and sell goods on their behalf [1]. It is based on 
continuous double auction mechanisms. In the Kasbah marketplace, buying and 
selling agents interact and compete simultaneously, making price bids to their 
counterparts. The agents have a function that changes the price they are willing to 
propose over time. A different negotiation approach involves negotiating over 
multiple terms of a transaction, unlike the typical way of auction negotiation, that 
only considers the price of the good. Tete-a-Tete is a system where agents 
cooperatively negotiate in this way. It intends to provide merchant differentiation 
through value-added services, like warranties, delivery times, etc. [4]. 
Following this more general approach, in [2] negotiation is defined as a process by 
which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties first verbalise 
contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process of concession 
making or search for new alternatives. In that paper, a many parties, many issues 
negotiation model is adopted, that is, multilateral negotiations (like a continuous 
double auction) about a set of issues (the transaction terms). Several negotiation 
tactics are tested, and a negotiation strategy model is explained. 
The work described in the present paper aims to combine those tactics in a 
dynamic way, in order to endow adaptive market agents with strategies (appropriate 
ways of selecting combinations of tactics) and to compare their performance with 
agents that are not adaptive. Since the marketplace is a dynamic environment, 
adaptive agents are expected to benefit from changing conditions, therefore taking 
advantage over others. A test-bed has been created to provide the interaction process 
between market agents with different capabilities. 
Section 2 describes our multi-agent platform for electronic commerce (the test-
bed), including the negotiation assumptions, model and protocols adopted (which 
have been based on those introduced in [2]). Section 3 gives details on negotiation 
tactics (also adopted from [2]) which can be combined to either user-defined 
strategies or strategies based on Reinforcement Learning techniques. Section 4 
focuses on several different scenarios and describes those situations that were chosen 
for testing purposes. Conclusions drawn from the testing scenarios are presented in 
section 5. We conclude the paper, in section 6, by presenting some topics of our 
future work. 
2   A System for Electronic Commerce 
In this section we describe the basic negotiation approach and the architecture of the 
SMACE (Sistema Multi-Agente para Comércio Electrónico) system. It is a multi-
agent system for electronic commerce, where users can create buyer and seller agents 
that negotiate autonomously, in order to make deals on services they are requesting or 
offering. SMACE has been used as a test-bed for different negotiation paradigms, 
both user-controlled and self-adaptive. 
2.1   Negotiation Model 
The negotiation model we have adopted is multilateral and based on many issues (that 
is, multidimensional), as described in [2]. Multilateral refers to the ability that each 
buying or selling agent has to negotiate simultaneously with many other selling or 
buying agents. In auction terms, it relates to a sealed-bid continuous double auction, 
where both buyers and sellers submit bids (proposals) simultaneously and trading 
does not stop as each auction is concluded (as each deal is made). In practical terms, 
this multilateral negotiation model works as many bilateral negotiations that can 
influence each other. The bilateral negotiation model we are using is based on the one 
defined in [5]. In our work, negotiation is realised by exchanging proposals between 
agents. The negotiation can be made over a set of issues instead of the single issue 
price found in most auctions. A proposal consists of a value for each of these issues 
and is autonomously generated and proposed by one agent. 
This negotiation model is also called a service-oriented negotiation model [2], 
since it involves two roles that are, in principle, in conflict: sellers of services and 
buyers of services. A service is something that can be provided by an agent and 
requested by some other agent, and over which they can negotiate. As a general rule, 
we can say that opponents in the negotiation process have opposing interests over all 
issues under negotiation. However it could happen that both agents have similar 
interests on a specific issue, thus proposal evolution may proceed in the same 
direction. 
The sequence of proposals and counter-proposals in a two-party negotiation is 
referred to as a negotiation thread. These proposals and counter-proposals are 
generated by linear combinations of functions, called tactics. Tactics use a certain 
criteria (time, resources, etc.) in generating a proposal for a given negotiation issue. 
Different weights can be assigned to each tactic used, representing the importance of 
each criterion for the decision making. Agents may wish to change their ratings of 
criteria importance over time. To do so, they use a strategy, defined as the way in 
which an agent changes the relative weights of the different tactics over time. 
For each issue j ∈ {1, …, n} under negotiation, each agent has a range of 
acceptable values [minij, maxij], and a scoring function Vij: [minij, maxij]  [0, 1], that 
gives the score an agent i assigns to a value of issue j in the range of its acceptable 
values. The higher the score, the better the agent’s utility. Agents also assign a weight 
wij to each negotiation issue that represents its relative importance. Assuming 
normalised weights (∑j wij = 1), the agent’s scoring function for a given proposal  
x = (x1, …, xn) combines the scores of the different issues in the multidimensional 
space defined by the issues’ value ranges: Vi(x) = ∑j wij Vij(xj). The overall proposal 
evaluates to a score of zero if any of the issues’ values is outside its range. 
2.2   Negotiation Protocol 
We assume for the negotiation protocol that message delivery is reliable and message 
delays need not to be considered (because they are presumably short). 
At a particular point in time each agent has an objective that specifies its intention 
to buy or sell a specific service. That objective has to be achieved in a certain amount 
of time, specified by a deadline. Negotiation stops when this deadline is reached. 
A bilateral negotiation starts after the two parties - the buyer and the seller – meet 
in the marketplace and match their objectives (i.e., they agree that what the buyer 
wants to buy is what the seller intends to sell). Once this is achieved, a negotiation 
thread xb↔s becomes active between the two agents. It will stay active while the 
agents negotiate with each other. 
The agents will then exchange a sequence of proposals and counter-proposals. 
When receiving a proposal, an agent will generate a counter-proposal. Both - the 
received proposal and the generated counter-proposal - will be evaluated using the 
scoring function described above, and the agent will answer with one of three possible 
ways: 
 withdraw from negotiation if the deadline was reached, or if a deal was made with 
some other agent; 
 accept the proposal received, if it scores higher than the one generated; 
 otherwise, send the generated proposal. 
When an agent b receives an accept message from agent a, it will respond with a 
deal confirmation or rejection. Since there can be virtually any number of agents in 
the marketplace, this solves the problem that could rise if an agent receives two 
simultaneous accept messages from two different agents (we are assuming that the 
agent’s objective only admits trading one unit of a service at a time). Therefore, if 
agent b did not commit with any other agent, it will close the deal with agent a, the 
sender of the accept message. This agent will wait until it gets an answer from agent 
b. A deadlock problem could rise if a group of agents was waiting for deal 
confirmations in a closed loop configuration. We address this problem by making 
agent a, which is expecting a deal confirmation, withdraw any other negotiations and 
reject any deal with any other agent. This means that eventually it will loose potential 
deals with other agents, if it receives a rejection from agent b. Since we are assuming 
short message delays, the problem of lost deals is not likely to occur often, and we 
ignore it. 
2.3   SMACE 
SMACE allows users to create buyer and seller agents that negotiate under the model 
and protocol described above. The system was implemented with the JDK1.1.4 API 
[9], and uses the JATLite [8] package to easily build agents that exchange KQML [10] 
messages. The agents communicate with each other in the MarketPlace, which is an 
enhanced JATLite router, facilitating the message routing between the agents and 
working as an information centre for the agents to announce themselves and search 
for contacts. 
The SMACE API consists of three layers built on top of the JATLite packages. 
These layers also consist of packages, and using the SMACE system can take place at 
any of them: 
 Infrastructure – this layer consists of two fundamental parts: 
 MarketAgent: a template for the creation of market agents. It already has 
implemented the model of negotiation and its associated protocol. The only task 
left to the user starting in this layer is providing his own negotiation tactics; 
 MarketPlace: the application that represents the marketplace, as a space where 
the agents meet and trade. It includes message routing and agent brokering 
facilities. 
 Plug&Trade – this layer includes predefined market agents that can also be seen as 
examples of how an agent can be built using the MarketAgent template: 
 MultipleTacticAgent (MTA): a market agent that is able to use a weighted 
combination of three tactics, one from each of the tactic families described in 
the next section, to generate its negotiation proposals. 
 AdaptiveBehaviourAgent (ABA): a market agent that is able to weight the 
several tactics that it is using in an adaptive way, using Reinforcement Learning 
techniques. 
 UserInterface – this layer consists of an application that provides both an HTML 
user interface for the creation and monitoring of Plug&Trade market agents 
operation and their persistence. 
While accepting agents from anywhere to enter the marketplace and trade 
(provided that they use the same negotiation protocol), SMACE allows the user to 
launch predefined agents (both of MTA and ABA types) by adjusting its parameters. In 
order to do so, one can use the SMACE user interface. Through this interface the 
agents’ activities can also be monitored and its parameters setting can be changed as 
well. Furthermore, the user may create his own agent, with his own tactics, in any 
programming language or platform he wishes. The SMACE API Infrastructure 
package assists agent building in Java. This package allows the user not to worry 
about communication and negotiation protocol details, spending his efforts on 
building his own negotiation strategy, that is to say, the agent’s deliberative 
knowledge. 
2.3.1   Agent Matching 
As mentioned before, market agents contact the MarketPlace to search for agents that 
have complementary objectives, i.e., objectives including opposite agents’ intentions 
over the same service. 
To facilitate the matching of services, these ones are described using what we call 
descriptive issues, i.e., descriptor/value pairs that all together define the object of 
negotiation. Then, values for the same descriptive issues for different objectives are 
compared, and if the agents agree that they are “talking” about the same service they 
will negotiate over it. The SMACE system can be easily configured to specify the 
descriptive issues that market agents will use to describe their own services. 
2.3.2   Negotiation Issues 
In order to negotiate properly, besides using the same communication and negotiation 
protocols, market agents should agree in what issues the negotiation will be about. 
The SMACE system can be easily configured to consider any number of 
negotiation issues. All the market agents created in the system will then use the same 
set of issues. These issues are all considered as uniform, in the sense that, for the 
market agents, they do not have a semantic attached. Therefore, each market agent 
will define a weight, a range of acceptable values and a scoring function for each one 
of the used issues. Opposite intentions (buying and selling) usually imply somehow 
contrasting scoring functions, e.g., the scoring function for the issue price is 
decreasing for buyers and increasing for sellers as the price increases. 
3   Tactics and Strategies 
One of the main aims of our work is to compare the performance of agents using 
strategies based on dynamic adaptive behaviours with those based on more 
conventional and less dynamic, or even static, behaviours. 
The goal of negotiation is maximising the utility gained in a transaction, and in 
order to do so the focus is on how to prepare appropriate proposals as well as counter-
proposals. 
The predefined SMACE market agents use a specific tactic or a combination of 
several tactics to generate proposals. We focused on tactics that we adopted from [2]: 
 Time-dependent tactics: agents vary their proposals as the deadline approaches. 
These tactics use a function depending on time that can be parameterised. 
 Resource-dependent tactics: agents vary their proposals based on the quantity of 
available resources. These tactics are similar to the time-dependent ones, except 
that the domain of the function used is the quantity of a resource other than time. 
This is done either by making the deadline dynamic or by making the function 
depend on an estimation of the amount of the resource. 
 Behaviour-dependent tactics: agents try to imitate the behaviour of their opponents 
in some degree. Different types of imitation can be performed, based on the 
opponent’s negotiation policy over a sequence of his proposals: proportional 
imitation, absolute imitation and averaged proportional imitation. 
3.1   Time-dependent Tactics 
Time-dependent tactics vary the proposals as the deadline approaches. An agent a has 
to find a deal until tamax . A proposal x for issue j from agent a to agent b at time t,  
0 ≤ t ≤ tamax, can be calculated as follows: 
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where Vaj is the scoring function whose gradient reflects the agent’s intention (as 
referred in subsection 2.3.2). 
Any αaj(t) function defining the time-dependent behaviour must satisfy these 
constraints: 0 ≤ αaj(t) ≤ 1 (offers are inside the range); αaj(0) = κ aj (κaj adjusts the 
initial value at initial time); αaj(tamax) = 1 (the reservation value – the smallest result of 
the scoring function Vaj – will be offered at the deadline). 
In order to satisfy these constraints two classes of functions are presented: 
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The parameter β ∈ ℜ+ is used to adjust the convexity degree of the curve, allowing 
the creation of an infinite number of possible tactics. For values of β < 1 the 
behaviour of both classes of functions can be described as boulware, i.e., concessions 
are made close to the deadline, otherwise the proposals are only slightly changed. 
With β > 1 the behaviour is called conceder. An agent prepared like this urges to 
make a deal and reaches its reservation value quickly. 
3.2   Resource-dependent Tactics 
Resource-dependent tactics vary the proposals based on the quantity of a resource 
available. Boulware behaviour, used in the presence of a large amount of resources, 
should change to conceder behaviour when resources run short. 
3.2.1   Dynamic-deadline Tactics 
This tactic sub-family varies the agent’s deadline according to the availability of a 
particular resource. The resource modelled here is the number of agents that are 
negotiating and the average length of the active negotiation threads. If a selling agent 
a notices many interested parties for its good then there is no need to urge for an 
agreement. The set of agents negotiating with agent a at time t is 
{ }active is   )( t aixitaN ↔=  (4) 
A dynamic deadline using the resource described above is 
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where µa is the time agent a assumes to be needed to negotiate with an opponent and 
|xti↔a| is the length of the negotiation thread between agent a and agent i. 
3.2.2   Resource-estimation Tactics 
Resource estimation tactics measure the quantity of a resource at a time t. Function α 
can be used to model this: 
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The function resource is here used to evaluate the amount of available resources at 
time t. The following examples model 
 interested parties: )()( taNtresource =  
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3.3   Behaviour-dependent Tactics 
Behaviour-dependent tactics try to imitate the behaviour of the agent's opponents up 
to a certain extent. This can be useful once opponents will not be able to exploit the 
agent’s strategy. Tactics of this family make counter-proposals influenced by the 
opponent's former actions. Following there are three different ways of using imitating 
behaviours, assuming the negotiation thread { nnnnnn t
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and δ ≥ 1. 
3.3.1   Relative Tit-For-Tat 
These tactics imitate proportionally an opponent's behaviour δ ≥ 1 steps ago. The 
length of the negotiation thread must be n > 2δ. The generated counter-proposal is: 
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The counter-proposal generated is calculated with the last proposal ( [j]n
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3.3.2   Random Absolute Tit-For-Tat 
These tactics imitate in absolute terms the opponent’s behaviour. They require the 
existence of a negotiation thread length of n > 2δ. The resulting counter-proposal is: 
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Parameter R(M) provides a way to overcome function’s local minima. The function 
R(M) returns a random integer in the space [0, M], where M is the threshold of 
imitative behaviour. 
3.3.3   Averaged Tit-For-Tat 
These tactics imitate proportionally by calculating the average evolution of a certain 
number of proposals to the last proposal. The parameter γ refers to the number of past 
proposals that are considered. The counter-proposal obtained is: 
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for γ2>n . The behaviour of averaged Tit-For-Tat when choosing γ = 1 is similar to 
relative Tit-For-Tat with δ = 1. 
3.4   User-defined Strategies 
Once an agent is created and correctly initiated, it can be activated in order to contact 
the marketplace, thus starting a new episode in its life. Within an episode, the 
objective can not be changed. The episode ends when the agent is deactivated. 
As defined in section 2.1, a strategy can be realised as the way weighted 
combinations of the former exposed tactics are selected. An agent’s strategy 
determines which combination of tactics should be used at any particular instant 
within an episode. The simplest strategy is to use the same combination at any time in 
that episode. 
The SMACE UserInterface allows the user to create a MTA, which combines three 
different tactics – one from each family described before. The sub-tactics are selected 
by fixing the parameters in the corresponding tactic family. Along with these 
parameters, the weight combination remains the same, unless the user explicitly 
provides different values for it. This means that a fixed weighted combination of 
tactics is always in use. The user can interact with the UserInterface to observe agent 
actions and change its parameters any time he wants, implementing by this way his 
own strategy. 
In order to make it possible to design and include new agent’s learning capabilities 
or for the user to reuse a successful agent, MarketAgents do not terminate after an 
episode. They can be reactivated again with possibly different objectives and, if 
desired, with different issues and tactics parameters. 
3.5   Adaptive Behaviour Based Strategies 
There are several approaches how adaptive behaviour could be achieved in the 
environment described. First let us precise the expression “adaptive behaviour”. 
SMACE provides a dynamic environment, i.e., various unknown agents are able to 
meet and negotiate for an interval of time and achieve some result by following a 
certain strategy. The strategy of an MTA is simple: it uses the weighted combination 
of tactics that the user supplies. Anyway it should not be necessary to supervise 
autonomous agents all the time. Once a user has specified the parameters for his 
agent’s tactics and also specified the combination of tactics by adjusting the 
respective relative weights, the agent will behave accordingly regardless the situation 
that it is facing at each particular movement. The tactics provide a means to adapt, in 
a certain range, to different situations considering certain resources as described in 
previous paragraphs. The initial proposal also plays an important role in negotiation. 
How to choose this initial value could also be learned by experience. Using different 
weighted combinations of tactics along the time in order to match the optimal one in 
each situation could enable an agent to have an adaptive behaviour and making better 
deals. However it can not be evaluated which combination of tactics ensures the most 
success. The space of possible combinations of interrelated variables and situations is 
indeed too large. 
Using the MarketAgent template from the SMACE API described in section 2.3, a 
learning algorithm was included in a new agent – AdaptiveBehaviourAgent (ABA) - to 
provide a way to find out what is the best weighted combination of tactics in any 
situation for any issue. In the following we are referring to the approach of a matrix 
with weights per tactic and issue for a proposal [2]. It is obvious that changing the 
weights that are responsible for the importance of each tactic, depending on 
situations, leads to an adaptive mechanism that provides an agent with more 
autonomy to react appropriately depending on both his sensor input and mental state. 
A matrix of these weights per issue for a proposal from agent a to agent b at time t 
looks like the following: 
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where ωij is issue i’s weight of tactic j. 
From the tactics explained before, we may configure many combinations of 10 
different tactics per issue per proposal, only by varying the following parameters: 
 Time-dependent function: polynomial, exponential 
 Resource-dependent tactic: dynamic deadline, resource-estimation 
 resource: agents, agents/negotiation threads, time 
 Behaviour-dependent tactic: relative Tit-For-Tat, random absolute Tit-For-Tat, 
averaged Tit-For-Tat 
Let there be a vector of 10 weights for these tactics for an issue j: Xj = (x1, x2, ..., x10). 
Provided that each ∑
=
=∧∈
10
1
1
n
nx 1.0]   ,... 0.2, 0.1, [0.0,nx  there are 92378 different 
weighted combinations of the 10 tactics, per issue, considered that the other 
parameters (First proposal constant, Convexity degree, Negotiation time with single 
agent, Step and Window Size) are fixed. However, applying the restrictions of an 
MTA that is allowed to combine only 3 tactics, under the same constraints, for the 
ABA it turns out that there are only 66 different weighted combinations left. That 
seems to be an acceptable amount of tactic combinations to analyse, in order to find 
out the best one in each situation. The choice to specify the other tactic’s parameters 
is left to the user as well as the selection of the 3 tactics, to be applied separately per 
issue. Then, it is up to the adaptive mechanism to adjust the weights for the specified 
tactics. 
3.5.1   Applying a Reinforcement Learning Algorithm 
In order to search for the best weighted combination of tactics in each situation, 
Reinforcement Learning seems to be promising as it learns online. In contrast, 
Supervised Learning is learning offline from examples, provided in a training set. It is 
not adequate to our domain, since in interacting problems – like negotiating in a 
dynamic environment – it is often impractical to obtain representative examples of 
desired behaviours. RL enables agents to learn from their own experiences. A kind of 
RL, Q-learning [6], selects an action in a certain state depending on the ranking of that 
state/action pair. In our case actions are vectors of weights (weighted combinations of 
tactics). These are referred to as actions in the rest of this paper. The Q-learning is 
guaranteed to converge to the optimal combinations of state/action pairs after each 
action has been tried sufficiently often. That seems to be feasible with 66 possible 
actions per issue. The ranking is due to rewards by matching actions to certain states. 
Our adaptive agent using RL algorithm Q-learning in the SMACE framework 
executes roughly the following steps per issue: 
 determines the current state per issue 
 chooses a weighted combination of tactics by selecting one from the available 66 
 uses this weighted combination of tactics for the next proposal 
 observes the resulting rewards 
It is obvious that the success of this process mainly depends on how the states are 
characterised. We therefore select some general settings that are supposed to stay 
unchanged during an episode and some others to identify states within an episode. We 
have assumed that what is important to learn is the optimal tactic weights for an 
episode’s static settings. These are the chosen tactics with their parameters, the 
intention (sell, buy) and the negotiation issue that all states within an episode have in 
common. This information is referred to as the FrameConditions. To distinguish 
states within an episode we then chose the number of trading partners 
(QuantityOfActiveThreads); the percentage of time left to the deadline 
(PercentageOfTimeLeft); if negotiating is actually established, the agent is waiting for 
opponents, it has already reached the deadline or made a deal (StateFlag). Thus a 
state can be represented as follows: 
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Now, the rewarding mechanism is chosen as follows. While making transitions 
between states in which the agent is negotiating the reward is always zero for each 
issue’s weighted combination of tactics. That is neutral respectively to the user-
specified conceder or boulware behaviour. Giving a negative reward would force the 
agent to need fewer proposals to reach a deal. But that would be unlike a 
predominantly boulware behaviour. Changing to a state that is indicated as a deal 
state, i.e., where the agent got an agreement, is rewarded with the agent’s own utility 
per issue. The circumstances of the deal, i.e., the values on which the agents agreed, 
influence the rewards. Different rewards honour those actions that increase the utility 
of an agent for that issue. Communication costs are here not considered. To calculate 
the utility per issue, the scoring function from each negotiable issue is used. In case of 
an agreement at the reservation value the utility is zero. The maximum utility is 
reached for the best possible score of the issue. Loosing a deal because of any reason 
indicates a bad weighted combination of tactics. Thus making a transition from a 
negotiating state to one where either the deadline was reached or the opponent 
decided to stop negotiating is punished, that is, rewarded with a negative value. This 
allows distinguishing this situation from deals at reservation values. The penalty 
mechanism also considers that unexplored actions might be better than those that have 
been punished. 
The Q-learning chooses, for each issue, the highest scored weighted combination 
of tactics. However, as the environment is dynamic, the same action may not lead to a 
desired result when applied to the same state. As a trade-off between exploitation of 
already considered good actions and exploration of yet unknown ones (or considered 
in the past inferior ones), Q-learning selects with a certain probability a non-greedy 
action. This can be achieved, for instance, with a action selection mechanism that uses 
either 
1. a small probability ε of choosing uniformly a non-greedy action (Epsilon-Greedy 
[6]) or 
2. a given degree of exploration Τ for choosing between non-greedy actions, while 
considering their ranking (this is called the Softmax [6] approach). 
4   Experimental Scenarios 
In a dynamic environment as the one provided by SMACE there could be an infinite 
number of scenarios, depending on the existing market agents and their objectives and 
negotiation settings. In this section we describe some situations that can prevent 
negotiation from being started or deals from being made. We provide a fixed scenario 
that avoids those situations in order to successfully test our market agents. 
4.1   Problematic Scenarios 
As all the agent’s negotiation settings are private, agents start negotiations without 
knowing if a deal is possible [2]. This private information includes their negotiation 
tactics, as well as their negotiation issues parameters – weights, value ranges and 
scoring functions. 
One problematic scenario involves agents with non-matching value ranges. Since 
proposals outside the range of acceptable values are always rejected, a deal in this 
situation is impossible, but as the negotiation process proceeds, communication costs 
are unnecessarily caused. Even when the value ranges overlap, it is not certain that the 
result of a negotiation will be a deal. That depends on a number of factors related with 
the agents’ proposal generation process, including the first proposal value. This first 
value may limit the range of proposed values to a sub-range of the acceptable values. 
Moreover, since there are no partial agreements, proposal values, that are already 
acceptable, could run out of its value range while other issues under negotiation 
converge to an acceptable value. Acceptable values still do not lead to a deal if the 
agent is looking for better scored values. 
4.2   Scenarios Features 
In this subsection we describe some assumptions related to the scenario where the 
first evaluations of our market agents are done. 
First, since we are interested on effective negotiation testing, we provide all the 
agents with the same service offered/requested. This, together with appropriate 
deadlines, ensures that they will start negotiating. Of course, we provide the 
marketplace with buyer and seller agents. 
Following the considerations discussed in section 2.3.2, all the agents will 
negotiate, for simplicity, over the single issue price. Since the ABAs learn 
independently per issue, this choice does not affect the results. 
In order to avoid the problem discussed in the previous subsection, we state that 
deals are always possible, that is, agents’ value ranges match totally or are subsets. 
We assume that agents with opposite intentions have concurrent scoring functions 
(as mentioned in section 2.1). 
To evaluate the possible success of the ABA model over the MTA model, we have 
chosen two different possible agent configurations. In these, MTA agents will use the 
same tactic configuration in all episodes where they are used. 
 Scenario 1: one ABA trading with one MTA (price value range of [1, 10] for both). 
→ We expected the ABA to increase its utility after a number of episodes, so we 
could confirm the ABA’s adaptation process. 
 Scenario 2: one ABA ([3, 10]) offering a service to one MTA ([1, 10]) and 
competing with another MTA ([1, 5]). The value ranges were configured like that 
to make it likely for the MTAs to agree faster than the ABA, in order to stimulate 
the ABA’s adaptation process. 
→ We expected the ABA to win deals with its best possible utility, after a number 
of episodes. 
For all MTAs, the tactic configuration was set to a single polynomial time-
dependent tactic, with a convexity degree parameter of one (β = 1) and a first 
proposal constant of zero (κ = 0), in order to use the whole value range. This 
configuration represents the simplest case of a MTA for the given value range, 
because, when generating proposals, it only considers its time left. 
The ABAs always used a combination of three tactics, all from the time-dependent 
family. The tactics’ settings were similar to that used in the MTAs, except that 
different convexity degree parameters were supplied, in order to enable three different 
behaviours: boulware (β = 0.01), linear (β = 1) and conceder (β = 100). We chose a 
combination of three time-dependent tactics to make it easier to provide those three 
behaviours. These are needed so that the ABAs are able to increase their utilities, by 
trying different weighted combinations inside that behaviour range. 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the ABAs’ learning state/action space, we reduced 
the number of possible actions, by limiting the available weights. 
To consider the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, actions were 
selected by using the Softmax algorithm and a degree of exploration Τ = 0.1. The 
parameters for the Q-learning algorithm were set to 0.1 for the learning rate and 0.9 
for the discount factor. 
5   Conclusions 
First experimental results suggest that the ABA’s learning capabilities were sufficient 
in order to beat its competitor (scenario 2). We observed on a 150 episodes 
experiment that the rough tendency was for the ABA to significantly increase the 
number of deals won over its competitor. However, the ABA was not successful in 
improving its utility on the deals it made. We believe this is due to the rewarding 
mechanism applied, which ranks the fact of getting a deal higher than the distinction 
between deal utilities. Furthermore, the exploration rate was not sufficient for the 
agent to try different tactic combinations in the episodes tested. The same difficulty 
appeared in scenario 1, where the ABA agent did not tend to increase the utility of its 
deals. This was also due to the fact that the use of conceder tactic combinations was 
preferred, since they lead faster to a deal and so their Q-values are increased in early 
stages of the adaptation process. 
Further experiments are needed to reason the observations described above. Also, 
by limiting to time-dependent tactics, we introduced a limitation to the ABA’s 
behaviour that may have prevented it from a better performance. Learning how to use 
the convexity degree parameter (β) might prove to be a more efficient way of learning 
how to use a time-dependent behaviour, since it can make it easier to reduce the 
state/action space involved. 
6   Future Work 
In the present paper, we described negotiation behaviours using independent weighted 
combinations of tactics for each one of the negotiation issues. We intend to further 
investigate on weighted combinations of tactics that consider correlation between 
those issues. We believe that agents might benefit from calculating several different 
issue values, for a proposal, that influence each other. 
Another aspect of future work relates to the exploration of other features of the Q-
learning, as well as to the application and comparison of different learning algorithms 
(other kinds of Reinforcement Learning and Genetic Algorithms) that may perform 
better in a dynamic market environment. We are also interested in testing agents that 
become somehow specialized in a specific tactic, by optimizing only the parameter 
values of that tactic to be used in a specific situation. 
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